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Abstract 
Facial impressions of trustworthiness guide social decisions in the general population, as 
shown by financial lending in economic Trust Games. As an exception, autistic boys fail to 
use facial impressions to guide trust decisions, despite forming typical facial trustworthiness 
impressions (Ewing et al., 2015). Here, we tested whether this dissociation between forming 
and using facial impressions of trustworthiness extends to neurotypical men with high levels 
of autistic traits. Forty-six Caucasian men completed a multi-turn Trust Game, a facial 
trustworthiness impressions task, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient, and two Theory of Mind 
tasks. As hypothesized, participants’ levels of autistic traits had no observed effect on the 
impressions formed, but negatively predicted the use of those impressions in trust decisions. 
Thus, the dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness 
extends to the broader autism phenotype. More broadly, our results identify autistic traits as 
an important source of individual variation in the use of facial impressions to guide 
behaviour. Interestingly, failure to use these impressions could potentially represent rational 
behaviour, given their limited validity. 
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Should I Trust You? Autistic Traits Predict Reduced Appearance-Based Trust Decisions 
 
Human faces convey rich social information about an individual’s perceived 
personality (Zebrowitz, 2005). For example, a 100ms exposure to a novel face is enough for 
consistent first impressions of trustworthiness to form (Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 
2009; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Rapid evaluation of trustworthiness from faces is important 
for survival as it can signal whether someone should be avoided or approached. These 
evaluations are well-understood (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015), and 
based on underlying cues such as emotional expression, gender, and attractiveness (Oosterhof 
& Todorov, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2013; 2016). Although facial impressions of 
trustworthiness are formed automatically, they are not especially accurate predictors of 
trustworthy behaviour (Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013). 
Regardless of their validity, facial impressions of trustworthiness can have a critical 
impact on social decisions in everyday life (Olivola, Funk, & Todorov, 2014). For example, 
more trustworthy-appearing host profile photos on Airbnb receive more bookings (Ert, 
Fleischer, & Magen, 2016). Surprisingly, host profile photos still influence booking decisions 
even when more valid information is available in the form of guest reviews. In a financial 
setting, borrowers on a peer-to-peer lending site are more likely to be funded if they had 
trustworthy-appearing photographs (Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012). In economic Trust 
Games run in controlled laboratory settings, facial impressions of partner trustworthiness also 
guide trust decisions, even when accurate information about trustworthy or untrustworthy 
behaviour is also available (e.g. Chang, Doll, van’t Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010). Together, 
this evidence suggests that facial impressions of trustworthiness are readily formed from 
faces and can have powerful effects on trust. 
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Importantly, although people show agreement in their facial impressions of 
trustworthiness (Rule et al., 2013), emerging research also indicates considerable individual 
variation in these impressions (Hehman, Sutherland, Flake, & Slepian, 2017). Hehman and 
colleagues (2017) found that variation in observers influenced facial impressions of 
trustworthiness as much as variation in the faces themselves. Understanding how individuals 
vary is one of the oldest psychological questions, yet critically, we have little understanding 
of the factors driving this observer variation in facial impressions of trustworthiness. Even 
more importantly, we also lack a clear understanding of how and why people differ in the 
extent to which they use these impressions to guide trust decisions, which is surprising given 
the critical social consequences of misplaced trust. 
One key potential source of this observer variation is autistic traits. Specifically, 
autism (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) may represent one extreme end of a 
continuous distribution of differences in social and cognitive style which extends to levels of 
non-clinical significance in relatives and the typical population: the ‘broader autism 
phenotype’ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Landry & 
Chouinard, 2016; Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, Childress, & Arndt, 1997). Given the social 
communication and interaction differences associated with autism, variation in autistic traits 
is a good candidate for a source of individual variation in the formation and use of facial 
impressions of trustworthiness. 
Indeed, there is strong behavioural and neuroimaging evidence for divergent face 
processing in autistic individuals as well as neurotypical individuals with high levels of 
autistic traits (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 
2004; Halliday, MacDonald, Sherf, & Tanaka, 2014; Pierce, Müller, Ambrose, Allen, & 
Courchesne, 2001). For example, compared to their non-autistic peers, autistic individuals 
show reduced ability and/or atypical patterns of neural activation when judging facial 
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emotional expressions (Critchley et al., 2000; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013) and when 
inferring social intentions from faces (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 
2001). Given that a key facial cue to trustworthiness impressions is emotional expression and 
that facial impressions involve judging intentions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Sutherland et 
al., 2016), autistic traits could affect facial impressions of trustworthiness. Consistent with 
this view, autistic people show atypical neural activation in brain regions associated with 
facial trustworthiness processing, such as the amygdala (Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007). 
Despite this evidence for atypical face processing, autistic people do not differ from 
their non-autistic peers when explicitly asked to form trustworthy impressions (Ewing, 
Caulfield, Read, & Rhodes, 2015; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013; S. White, Hill, 
Winston, & Frith, 2006) and their impressions show the usual influence of emotional 
expressions (Caulfield, Ewing, Burton, Avard, & Rhodes, 2014). Critically, however, they do 
not appear to use these impressions to guide social decisions. In an age-appropriate Trust 
Game, autistic boys did not use facial impressions of trustworthiness to guide their decisions, 
despite forming similar facial impressions of trustworthiness to neurotypical children when 
directly asked to do so (Ewing et al., 2015). Ewing and colleagues (2015) proposed that 
autistic children show a functional dissociation between forming facial impressions of 
trustworthiness when explicitly asked to do so and implicitly using these impressions to guide 
behaviour. Interestingly, if facial impressions are not especially accurate predictors of actual 
trustworthiness (Rule et al., 2013), failure to use them to guide trust decisions may actually 
represent highly rational social behaviour. 
Current Study 
Here, we ask whether neurotypical adults with high levels of behavioural traits 
associated with autism show the same functional dissociation between forming explicit facial 
impressions of trustworthiness and using these impressions when making trust decisions, as 
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found in autistic children (Ewing et al., 2015). If autistic traits exist on a continuum (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001), then the functional dissociation observed in autism 
may also influence behaviour - to varying, milder degrees - in the general population. If so, 
this finding would pinpoint an important source of observer variation in the use of facial 
trustworthiness impressions. 
Individual differences in autistic traits were measured using the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ), a well-established self-report questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, et al., 2001). Typicality of facial impressions of trustworthiness was measured by 
comparing participants’ ratings of facial trustworthiness to those from an independent group 
of raters, so that each participant’s score reflected their agreement with typical 
trustworthiness impressions (following Mathersul et al., 2013; S. White et al., 2006; 
Zebrowitz, Franklin Jr, Hillman, & Boc, 2013). 
Appearance-based trust decisions were measured using a modified Trust Game based 
on previous research (Chang et al., 2010; Ewing et al., 2015; Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola, & 
Chater, 2012; van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). In the Trust Game, participants had to decide 
how much money to transfer to virtual ‘partners’ that appeared trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
Appearance-based trust was defined as the money transferred to trustworthy-appearing minus 
untrustworthy-appearing partners (following Chang et al., 2010). Facial impressions were not 
accurate predictors of partner behaviour, so that the most rational strategy was to ignore them 
and rely only on one’s personal experience with partner behaviour. We also examined the 
effect of social experience by manipulating trustworthy or untrustworthy partner behaviour 
during the Trust Game (i.e., return on investments), in addition to appearance (following 
Chang et al., 2010). Participants played multiple turns with the same partner, allowing them 
to experience how trustworthy their partner’s behaviour was. Trustworthy partners 
transferred a fair share of money back and untrustworthy partners unfairly kept the money. 
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Participants’ experience-based trust decisions were defined as the money transferred to the 
fair minus the unfair partners (following Chang et al., 2010). 
We additionally included a brief IQ measure (the WASI-II) to control for the effects 
of general intelligence on responses during the facial trustworthiness impressions task and 
Trust Game (following Ewing et al., 2015). We also included a version of the Trust Game 
with slot machines rather than faces (Slot Machine Game) to control for individual 
differences in non-social task factors, such as reward sensitivity and general willingness to 
invest (following Chang et al., 2010). Finally, we included two tasks measuring theory of 
mind (ToM), to assess the ability to infer the beliefs, intentions and perspectives of others. 
Higher AQ has been linked with reduced perspective taking and ToM (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001), and reduced ToM has been linked with atypical Trust Game 
play (Chan & Chen, 2011), suggesting that ToM may mediate the relationship between 
autistic traits and trustworthiness processing. We used the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) because it measures ability to infer 
complex mental attributions from faces, similar to judging intentions. We also used the False-
belief/Deception Comprehension task (Langdon, Connors, & Connaughton, 2017), which has 
been used previously to demonstrate poor first- and second-order ToM abilities in adults with 
schizophrenia compared to healthy controls. Unlike the RMET, this second ToM task 
provides a measure of ability in inferring mental-states independent of face perception. We 
focused on males, because the dissociation between formation and use of facial 
trustworthiness impressions was previously found in autistic boys (Ewing et al., 2015). 
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Method 
Participants  
Forty-six men (Age: M = 21.15, SD = 3.71, range = 13) participated, after giving 
informed consent to procedures approved by (removed for purposes of blind review) Human 
Research Ethics Committee. Sample size was based on an a-priori power analysis (G*power; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), which confirmed that 23 males would give 0.90 
power to detect the effect size found in Ewing et al.’s (2015) sample. Given our non-clinical 
sample and correlational design, we aimed to recruit approximately double this minimum 
sample size to allow for a more conservative effect size. 
Only native English-speaking Caucasian participants were recruited, to ensure that 
participants fully understood the tasks and to avoid other-race effects that may impact face 
processing, as the face stimuli in the tasks were Caucasian (e.g., Hancock & Rhodes, 2008). 
We tested young adults, since age may affect facial impressions of trustworthiness (Castle et 
al., 2012). Participants were recruited via a first year Psychology undergraduate volunteer 
pool, personal invitation, and poster advertisement. They were given payment based on 
performance in the Trust Game and Slot Machine Game, to ensure these games were 
consequential and the results generalizable to real financial lending. Specifically, participants 
were told they would receive $5, $10, $15 or $20 based on broad quartiles of the total 
averaged money made in the Trust Game and Slot Machine Game. First year Psychology 
undergraduates were also given credit points. 
Tasks 
Autistic traits (AQ). The autism spectrum quotient (AQ) is a self-report measure of 
traits associated with autism in the general population, with good reliability and validity 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). The 50 items enquire about everyday 
behaviours and preferences (e.g., “I like to plan any activities I participate in carefully”). We 
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used the full scale scoring (1 = definitely agree to 4 = definitely disagree) to maximise 
information about individual differences (Austin, 2005). The highest possible AQ score was 
200 and the lowest possible was 50. Higher AQ scores indicate higher autistic trait levels 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). 
Facial trustworthiness impressions task. After completing two practice trials, 
participants rated 40 female faces on their trustworthiness in one pseudo-randomised order, 
using a 9-point scale (1 = not at all trustworthy to 9 = extremely trustworthy). We used 
ambient face images (see Sutherland et al., 2013 for a discussion on the importance of using 
naturalistic stimuli) taken from the 10K US adult face database (Bainbridge, Isola, & Oliva, 
2013). Faces were Caucasian females, emotionally neutral, front facing, and had direct gaze. 
We used a single face ethnicity and gender to avoid potential race or gender effects on facial 
impressions of trustworthiness (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2018). 
This principle is used in many standardized tests (e.g. the Cambridge Face Memory Test: 
Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). 
Typicality of facial impressions was measured as the correlation between each 
individual participant’ trustworthiness ratings and consensus mean trustworthiness ratings 
across the 40 faces (following Mathersul et al., 2013; S. White et al., 2006; Zebrowitz et al., 
2013). Consensus ratings were taken from a large group of independent raters (N = 47 
Caucasian adults recruited online) and had excellent reliability at the group level (Cronbach’s 
α = .95). 
Trust Game. Participants played a multi-turn Trust Game with virtual partners, 
closely based on a previous study (Chang et al., 2010; see Figure 1 for the procedure). On 
each turn, participants received $10 of virtual money. They then viewed their partner’s face 
for 3.5 s and were required to choose an amount between $0 and $10 to give to their partner. 
Any investment the participant gave to their partner was quadrupled. Their partner would 
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then ‘decide’ to either return an equal split of the money (trustworthy behaviour) or keep the 
money and return nothing (untrustworthy behaviour). Thus, if the partner was trustworthy the 
participant gained double their investment, and if the partner was untrustworthy the 
participant lost their investment. Participants additionally kept any amount of the virtual $10 
not invested. If participants took longer than eight seconds to make an offer, they forfeited 
their money for that turn (this event occurred only eight times during testing and these trials 
were treated as missing data in our analysis). 
After completing two practice trials with cartoon partners, participants played eight 
turns with four partners (eight turns × four partners = 32 trials). Two of the four partners were 
trustworthy-looking and two were untrustworthy-looking and partners were either fair or 
unfair in behaviour. Partner behaviour was fully crossed with partner facial appearance (i.e. a 
trustworthy-appearing partner could be fair or unfair in behaviour) and assignment of partner 
behaviour to facial appearance was counterbalanced across participants. To increase the 
sample size of images, two sets of possible face photographs were used (participants viewed 
one set, following Chang et al., 2010). Each partner was not presented more than twice in a 
row and the same category of facial trustworthiness or behaviour was not presented more 
than three times in a row. Each participant received the same pseudo-random order of 
partners because the task was designed to measure individual differences. 
Partner facial trustworthiness. Partner images were chosen to appear trustworthy or 
untrustworthy, based on pilot categorisation judgments (N = 39 Caucasian adults recruited 
online). At least 75% of pilot judges agreed that the ‘trustworthy’ face images looked 
trustworthy and the ‘untrustworthy’ faces looked untrustworthy. As above, face stimuli were 
taken from the 10K US adult face database (Bainbridge et al., 2013). 
Partner trustworthy behaviour. Fair partners returned an equal split of money to 
participants on seven out of eight turns. Conversely, unfair partners unfairly kept all of the 
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money on seven out of eight turns. Behaviour was probabilistic to prevent the game from 
being too easy and to better replicate real world social interaction (following Chang et al., 
2010). Appearance and behaviour were unrelated. 
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked some additional questions at the end of 
the Trust Game, to check they perceived the faces as intended and understood the game. They 
were asked to rate each partner’s face on their trustworthiness levels between 1 and 10 (1 = 
not at all trustworthy and 10 = extremely trustworthy). They were also required to rate 
partners on their fairness levels, defined as the percentage of times their partner returned 
money (0 = 0% to 9 = 90% in 10% increments). 
Control tasks. We included a non-social version of the Trust Game, the Slot Machine 
Game, to control for any non-social determinants of performance (e.g. reward sensitivity, 
investment generosity, and understanding of mathematical probabilities). The Slot Machine 
Game was identical to the Trust Game, except that participants played with four different 
coloured slot machines instead of ‘human’ partners (following Chang et al., 2010). 
The Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was also used as a general control measure, in case 
intelligence impacted participants’ concentration levels, ability to grasp gameplay, or 
understanding of trustworthiness concepts. IQ was measured using the two-subtest form of 
the Revised Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011).  
Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. We included two tasks to measure ToM: the revised, 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” task (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) 
and a revised, adult version of the false-belief Sally-Anne task (the False-belief/Deception 
Comprehension task: (Langdon et al., 2017). RMET scores were calculated by totalling the 
number of correct answers for each participant. False-belief scores were calculated by 
summing the first and second order ToM accuracy scores, representing accurate prediction 
and explanation of the story characters’ behaviour by understanding mental states. Each story 
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also included a comprehension question that was correctly answered by all participants, 
demonstrating that they understood each story. 
General Procedure 
All tasks were performed on an iMac computer (21.5 inch screen), except for the 
WASI-II, which was administered individually by the experimenter. Participants completed 
the Trust Game (15 min), Slot Machine Game (15 min), facial trustworthiness impressions 
task (five min), two Theory of Mind tasks (10 min), WASI-II (15 min), and the AQ (five 
min), in that order. Additional measures were completed before the WASI-II and after the 
AQ, as part of a different study. The facial trustworthiness impressions task was completed 
after the Trust Game and Slot Machine Game to avoid priming participants on the concept of 
‘trustworthiness’. The AQ was completed last so that any self-reflection produced by the 
questionnaire would not affect decision-making in the Trust Game and Slot Machine Game. 
No deception was used and participants were fully debriefed after the experiment. The testing 
session lasted approximately one and a half hours. 
 
Results 
Data Screening 
One participant’s data was excluded from the facial trustworthiness impressions task, 
due to a lack of variability in their responses (i.e. pressing the same button). Due to computer 
error, one participant’s data was also missing from the manipulation checks at the end of the 
Trust Game. There were no univariate or multivariate outliers identified using the Tukey 
fences method and via checking the Mahalanobis distance scores. All variables were 
appropriately distributed for parametric analyses: skew range |0.07 – 1.51|, kurtosis range 
|0.27 – 3.50| (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and the full table of correlations in Table 
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S1 in the supplementary materials). Data will be made available online with the published 
paper. 
Manipulation Checks 
To check that facial trustworthiness and partner behaviour in the Trust Game were 
perceived as expected, participants rated the facial trustworthiness and fairness of partners at 
the end of the Trust Game. Overall, as expected, participants gave significantly higher facial 
trustworthiness ratings to trustworthy-appearing partners (M = 5.27, SD = 1.44) than 
untrustworthy-appearing partners (M = 4.11, SD = 1.13): t(44) = 3.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.90. Participants also gave significantly higher fairness percentages to fair partners (M = 
72.0%, SD = 15.4%) than unfair partners (M = 20.8%, SD = 13.3%): t(44) = 15.08, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 3.56. Therefore, the Trust Game manipulations worked as expected. 
Autistic traits and Facial Impressions of Trustworthiness 
Scores on the AQ showed good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .82), were comparable to 
previous research with adults (M = 112.8, SD = 13.9: Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 
2008), and had a broad range (see Figure 2). Facial trustworthiness impression scores were 
calculated as a Pearson product-moment correlation between participants’ trustworthiness 
ratings of the faces and consensus ratings of the same faces, collected from an independent 
sample. Correlations were Fisher transformed before analysis. 
As expected, participant levels of autistic traits did not significantly predict facial 
trustworthiness impression scores, β = -.03, p = .859, N = 45 (see Figure 3), even after 
controlling for general intelligence (IQ composite scores from the WASI-II), β = .01, p = 
.959 (see Table 2). Thus, autistic traits had no observed effect on the impressions formed. 
Autistic Traits and Appearance-Based Trust Decisions 
 Appearance-based trust decisions were calculated as the difference between money 
transferred to trustworthy-appearing partners minus untrustworthy-appearing partners, on 
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average on the initial four trials of the Trust Game (i.e. before feedback about partner 
behaviour became available). We first assessed the effect of appearance-based trust decisions 
across the whole group, to establish that our Trust Game was sensitive to appearance-based 
trust decisions and to replicate previous findings (e.g. Chang et al., 2010). Participants 
transferred significantly more money on average to trustworthy-appearing partners (M = 5.97, 
SD = 1.94) than untrustworthy-appearing partners (M = 3.33, SD = 2.37), on initial Trust 
Game trials: paired samples t-test t(45) = 5.86, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.22. Thus overall, 
participants relied on the apparent facial trustworthiness of their partners to guide their trust 
decisions at the start of the Trust Game (replicating previous studies: Chang et al., 2010; 
Rezlescu et al., 2012; van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008).  
As expected, autistic traits significantly negatively predicted appearance-based trust 
decisions, β = -.32, p = .028, N = 46 (see Figure 4a), which remained significant after 
controlling for general intelligence and initial money transferred to the first four slot 
machines in the Slot Machine Game, R2 change = .11, β = -.34, p = .030 (see Table 3). Thus, 
autistic traits were significantly negatively related to appearance-based trust decisions, even 
when controlling for non-social aspects of gameplay. Importantly, autistic traits predicted 
appearance-based trust decisions significantly more than facial trustworthiness impressions: 
t(87) = 2.32, p = .023. This finding supports the predicted dissociation between forming 
facial trustworthiness impressions and using these impressions to make trust decisions. 
To explore the types of autistic traits driving the significant negative association 
between autistic traits and appearance-based trust decisions, we examined the relationship 
between appearance-based trust decisions and the ‘social interaction’ and ‘attention to detail’ 
subscales of the AQ (as used in Rhodes, Jeffery, Taylor, & Ewing, 2013, based on a factor 
analysis of the AQ: Hoekstra et al., 2008). These subscales target social and non-social traits, 
respectively, and had reasonable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .83 and .69 
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respectively). The analyses were Bonferroni-corrected (adjusted alpha level of .025) for 
multiple comparisons because they were exploratory. The ‘attention to detail’ subscale 
significantly negatively predicted appearance-based trust decisions, β = -.42, p = .004, N = 
46. That is, participants who scored highly on items like “I tend to notice details that others 
do not” were less likely to be influenced by their partners’ appearance during the trust game. 
By contrast, the ‘social interaction’ subscale did not significantly predict appearance-based 
behaviour, β = -.21, p = .165, N = 46. The effect of ‘attention to detail’ remained significant 
when controlling for general intelligence and initial money transferred to slot machines, R2 
change = .18, β = -.42, p = .004. 
Autistic traits were not significantly correlated with either ToM measure: RMET 
scores, r = -.03, p = .831, N = 46, False-belief scores, r = -.10, p = .501, N = 46 (unlike in 
previous research: e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001), providing no evidence 
that ToM mediated the observed relationship between autistic traits and appearance-based 
trust decisions. 
Autistic Traits and Experience-based Trust Decisions 
Experience-based trust decisions were calculated as the difference in money 
transferred to fair partners minus unfair partners, on average across all trials of the Trust 
Game where feedback on partner fair or unfair behaviour was available (i.e. all trials except 
the first four). We first assessed the effect of experience-based trust decisions across the 
whole group, to ascertain that our Trust Game was sensitive to experience-based trust 
decisions and to replicate previous findings (Chang et al., 2010). Participants transferred 
significantly more money on average to fair partners (M = 6.66, SD = 1.55) than unfair 
partners (M = 2.35, SD = 1.60): paired samples t-test t(45) = 13.73, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
2.74. Overall, participants relied on experience with partner behaviour to guide their trust 
decisions (consistent with previous research: Chang et al., 2010). 
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Importantly, autistic traits did not significantly predict experience-based trust 
decisions: β = -.19, p = .196, N = 46 (see Figure 4b; Table 4), nor did this result change when 
controlling for general intelligence and money transferred based on slot machine ‘behaviour’ 
(i.e. difference in the averaged money transferred to fair and unfair slot machines across all 
Slot Machine Game trials except the first four), β = -.07, p = .549. Therefore, there was no 
evidence that autistic traits promoted less rational social decisions based on experience in the 
Trust Game. 
 
Discussion 
Facial impressions of trustworthiness can have a powerful impact on social decisions 
to trust others (Duarte et al., 2012; Ert et al., 2016), but can have a reduced impact on the 
social decisions of autistic people (Ewing et al., 2015). Here for the first time, we found that 
neurotypical men with higher levels of autistic traits were less likely to use facial impressions 
to guide trust decisions, despite their ability to form typical facial impressions of 
trustworthiness when explicitly asked to do so. Thus the functional dissociation between 
forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness found in autistic boys (Ewing et al., 
2015) extends to the broader autism phenotype. More generally, our results identify an 
important source of variation in the use of facial impressions to guide trusting behaviour, a 
key social task. 
Autistic Traits and the Functional Dissociation for Facial Trustworthiness  
Autistic trait levels had no effect on explicit facial impressions of trustworthiness. 
This pattern is consistent with previous findings that autistic individuals show typical facial 
impressions of trustworthiness (Ewing et al., 2015; Mathersul et al., 2013; S. White et al., 
2006). Importantly, however, autistic traits were negatively related to trust decisions based on 
partner appearance, showing that neurotypical individuals with higher levels of autistic traits 
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were less influenced by partner appearance when making trust decisions. Thus, the functional 
dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness found in 
autistic boys (Ewing et al., 2015) extends to the broader autism phenotype (Piven et al., 
1997). Not surprisingly, the effect size relating autistic traits to facial appearance biases was 
weaker than found when examining children with and without autism (Ewing et al, 2015). 
Nevertheless, it was reasonably strong, with autistic traits explaining 11% of the variance in 
those biases (after controlling for general intelligence and generosity). 
What potential mechanisms might explain the functional dissociation between 
forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness? From a perceptual perspective, this 
dissociation could be due to less spontaneous formation of facial impressions of 
trustworthiness in individuals with higher AQ scores, when not explicitly asked to judge 
facial trustworthiness. An alternative explanation for this dissociation is that men with 
autistic traits can spontaneously evaluate facial trustworthiness, but are less likely to 
functionally apply these evaluations to complex trust decisions. 
Our exploratory findings suggest that a heightened attention to detail may be the core 
characteristic that drives this pattern of cognitive processing and behaviour. Potentially, 
greater attention to local details may make it more difficult for men with higher levels of 
autistic traits to spontaneously process a holistic facial impression, such as trustworthiness 
(Santos & Young, 2011; Todorov, Loehr, & Oosterhof, 2010). This pattern fits with other 
studies in which atypical face processing in autistic people can be explained by a bias 
towards processing local rather than global features of faces (Behrmann et al., 2006; Happé 
& Frith, 2006). Although Theory of Mind (ToM) requires the functional attribution of mental 
states to others, we found no evidence that it can explain the resistance to use facial 
impressions of trustworthiness to guide behaviour in men with high levels of autistic traits. 
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Is Reduced Use of Facial Trustworthiness a Social Disadvantage? 
If facial appearance accurately reflects trustworthy behaviour, then relying on first 
impressions of trustworthiness to guide trust decisions may be a beneficial social strategy. 
However, facial cues may not be accurate indicators of general trustworthiness (Rule et al., 
2013). When facial appearance is misleading, relying on appearance to guide trust decisions 
will lead to poor social judgment. In that case, the reduced reliance on facial trustworthiness 
found in men with higher levels of autistic traits may actually represent more rational social 
behaviour.  
Moreover, even potentially rational trust behaviour could cause autistic individuals to 
be unpredictable in social interactions, due to its atypicality, contributing to interpersonal 
difficulties when interacting with the neurotypical majority. For example, choosing a 
trustworthy-looking profile picture for use online is arguably now a critical social skill (D. 
White, Sutherland, & Burton, 2017) with important real-life ramifications (Olivola et al., 
2014). It is important to understand the social impact of a reduced reliance on facial 
trustworthiness, given that these judgements can have real consequences. Indeed, we also 
found that facial trustworthiness guided initial trust decisions at the group level even though 
people knew that the Trust Game had real financial penalties (consistent with previous work: 
Chang et al., 2010; Rezlescu et al., 2012; van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). 
In contrast to facial impressions, experience with an individual’s fair or unfair 
behaviour is a valid predictor of their trustworthiness (King-Casas et al., 2005). Therefore, 
our Trust Game was designed so that experience with behaviour predicted a partner’s 
trustworthiness whereas facial appearance did not, and, as a result, using experience with 
partner behaviour to guide trust decisions was the most rational game strategy. We found no 
evidence that autistic traits related to trust decisions based on experience with partner 
behaviour. In this sense, men with higher levels of autistic traits made trust decisions that 
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were just as rational as those in men with lower levels; they used trust information when it 
was useful (i.e. experience with behaviour) but not when it was not useful (i.e. misleading 
facial appearance). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Trust Games can model how facial impressions of trustworthiness guide social 
decisions in controlled laboratory settings (e.g. van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and our game 
employed pre-programmed ‘partners’, in order that we could carefully control facial 
appearance. It is possible that the resistance of individuals with higher autistic traits to using 
facial impressions reflects a lack of engagement in the game, at least when playing with 
‘partners’ (and not slot machines). It will be interesting to see whether the results generalise 
to live social interactions. 
Trust Games themselves involve investment decisions that are motivated by extrinsic 
monetary rewards (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Consequently, our current findings relate 
especially to social settings where facial trustworthiness impacts on financial decisions, such 
as trading on peer-to-peer lending sites (Duarte et al., 2012) or choosing accommodation on 
Airbnb (Ert et al., 2016). Another interesting future direction would be to examine how 
autistic traits relate to trust behaviour or facial appearance biases in social settings that do not 
involve financial decisions, such as electoral voting or jury verdicts, given that these settings 
are also subject to facial trustworthiness biases (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005; 
Wilson & Rule, 2015). Interestingly, Bayliss and Tipper (2006) also previously found, using 
a gaze-cuing paradigm, that individuals with higher autistic traits were less likely to use facial 
cues in their trustworthiness decisions, where trustworthiness was (accurately) cued by 
predictive or deceptive gaze. Thus, our finding that individuals with higher autistic traits were 
also less guided by facial cues to trustworthiness in a trust game, may represent a more 
general pattern of behaviour that generalises across contexts. 
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Finally, autistic traits appear to represent an important individual difference 
underlying how facial impressions guide trust decisions, a relatively new area of study. In 
future, it will be important to chart the contributions of other individual differences, such as 
other key personality traits (Chan & Chen, 2011) or beliefs around the validity of facial 
appearance as a guide to trustworthy character (Suzuki, Tsukamoto, & Takahashi, 2017). 
Conclusions 
Variation in autistic traits in neurotypical individuals is associated with the extent to 
which facial impressions of trustworthiness influence social decision-making. When making 
trust decisions, neurotypical men with higher levels of autistic traits relied less on facial 
appearance information than those with lower levels, despite forming typical impressions 
when prompted to do so. Interestingly, failure to use these impressions could potentially 
represent rational behaviour, given their limited validity. Variation in autistic traits did not 
influence trust decisions based on actual partner behaviour, or in a non-social version of the 
game, and therefore did not represent a general disadvantage when making trust decisions.  
These results demonstrate that the dissociation between formation and use of facial 
impressions of trustworthiness found in autism (Ewing et al, 2015) extends to the broader 
phenotype. Neurotypical men with higher levels of autistic traits may therefore show more 
resistance to the influence of unreliable facial cues to trustworthiness in guiding everyday 
behaviour.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for task variables. All N = 46 apart from the facial trustworthiness 
impressions (N = 45). 
Variables Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
AQ total 112.78 13.87 88.00 155.00 0.73 1.14 
AQ Attention to detail  24.78 4.54 17.00 37.00 0.17 -.38 
AQ Interpersonal  88.00 12.43 69.00 127.00 1.11 1.73 
RMET total score 26.24 3.35 17.00 33.00 -0.67 0.35 
False-belief Stories (1st 
and 2nd order ToM) 
8.89 2.20 4.00 12.00 -0.14 -0.98 
IQ (WASI composite 
score) 
110.74 9.27 92.00 138.00 0.60 0.80 
Facial trustworthiness 
impressions 
0.33 0.20 -0.02 0.80 0.28 -0.67 
Money ($) to 
trustworthy-looking 
partners (initial trials) 
5.97 1.94 2.00 10.00 0.10 -0.67 
Money ($) to 
untrustworthy-looking 
partners (initial trials)  
3.33 2.37 0.00 9.00 0.42 -0.27 
Money ($) to trust minus 
untrust-looking partners 
(initial trials) 
2.64 3.06 -4.00 10.00 0.07 -0.44 
Money ($) to fair partners 
(all trials except initial) 
6.66 1.55 2.36 10.00 -0.57 0.67 
Money ($) to unfair 
partners (all trials except 
initial) 
2.35 1.60 0.21 8.14 1.51 3.50 
Money ($) to fair minus 
unfair partners (all trials 
except initial) 
4.32 2.13 -1.14 8.21 -0.50 0.49 
Slot Machine control 
(money transferred, 
initial trials) 
5.24 1.47 2.50 9.50 0.40 0.77 
Slot Machine control 
(money to fair versus 
unfair slot machines) 
5.15 2.63 0.00 9.64 -0.11 -0.89 
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Table 2 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting facial trustworthiness impression scores from 
autistic traits (AQ scores; N = 45). 
Predictor B ± SE β t p Partial r R2 
Step 1      .06 
IQ .01 ± .00 .24 1.62 .112 .24  
Step 2      .06 
IQ  .01 ± .00 .24 1.59 .118 .24  
AQ .00 ± .00 .01 .05 .959 .01  
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Table 3 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting money transferred based on partner facial 
trustworthiness (initial four trials of the trust game) from Autistic Traits (AQ scores; N = 46). 
Predictor B ± SE β t p Partial r R2 
Step 1      .00 
IQ .02 ± .05 .05 .32 .750 .05  
Slot Machine 
Game control 
-.05 ± .34 -.02 -.15 .882 -.02 
 
Step 2      .11 
IQ  -.01 ± .05 -.02 -.14 .892 -.02  
Slot Machine 
Game control 
-.17 ± .33 -.08 -.53 .601 -.08 
 
AQ  -.07 ± .03 -.34 -2.25 .030* -.33  
Note. Slot Machine Game control is the average money transferred to the first four slot machines 
in the Slot Machine Game. *p < .05. 
  
  AUTISTIC TRAITS PREDICT TRUST DECISIONS     31 
Table 4 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting money transferred based on partner behaviour 
(throughout the Trust Game, except the initial four trials) from Autistic Traits (AQ scores; N 
= 46). 
Predictor B ± SE β t p Partial r R2 
Step 1      .42 
IQ .08 ± .03 .35 3.05 .004** .42  
Slot Machine 
Game control 
.47 ± .09 .58 4.98 <.001*** .60 
 
Step 2      
.43 
IQ  .08 ± .03 .34 2.88 .006** .41  
Slot Machine 
Game control 
.46 ± .10 .57 4.81 <.001*** .60 
 
AQ  -.01 ± .02 -.07 -.60 .549 -.09  
Note. Slot Machine Game control is the difference in money transferred to fair versus unfair 
slot machines, averaged throughout the Slot Machine Game except for the first four trials. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a single turn from the Trust Game. Note. Instead of transferring money, 
participants could also choose to transfer no money by pressing a key labelled as ‘no money’. 
The face above is an example due to copyright reasons and was not one of the faces used in 
the Trust Game. 
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Figure 2. Histogram of autistic traits (AQ scores; N = 46). The normal distribution curve is 
shown.  
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of autistic traits (AQ scores) and facial trustworthiness impression 
scores, representing the extent to which each participant agreed with independent consensus 
ratings, as measured by individual Pearson’s correlations (N = 45). The best-fitting regression 
line is shown and the overall Person’s correlation. 
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Figure 4. A) Scatter plot of autistic traits (AQ scores) and appearance-based trust decisions 
(on average across the initial four Trust Game trials, before feedback about behaviour 
became available). The best-fitting regression line is shown (N = 46). B) Scatterplot of 
autistic traits (AQ scores) and experience-based trust decisions (on average across all Trust 
Game trials where feedback about fair or unfair behaviour was available). The best-fitting 
regression line is shown and the overall Person’s correlations (N = 46). Note. The top right of 
each figure displays the money transferred to trustworthy-appearing (T) and untrustworthy-
appearing (U) partners, or fair-behaving (F) and unfair-behaving (U) partners, collapsed 
across all participants. SE bars are shown. * p <.05, *** p < .001. 
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Supplementary materials 
 
 
Table S1 
Pearson’s correlations and associated p-values between main task variables. All N = 46 
apart from the facial trustworthiness impressions (N = 45). 
 
 
AQ IQ RMET False-
belief 
Stories 
Facial 
trust. 
impress. 
Money 
(looks) 
Money 
(fairness) 
Slot 
Game  
control 
(total 
initial) 
IQ (WASI composite) -.156        
.299 
 
      
RMET (total score) -.032 .271       
.831 .068 
 
     
False-belief Stories (1st and 
2nd order ToM) 
-.102 .26 .406**      
.501 .081 .005 
 
    
Facial trustworthiness 
impressions 
-.027 .24 .344* .461**     
.859 .112 .021 .001 
 
   
Money ($) to trust minus 
untrust looking partners 
(initial trials) 
-.324* .061 .094 .060 .039    
.028 .686 .534 .692 .798 
 
  
Money ($) to fair minus 
unfair partners (all trials 
except initial) 
-.194 .306* .253 .240 .318* .282   
.196 .039 .09 .109 .033 .058 
 
 
Slot Game control initial 
money ($) transferred  
-.095 -.366* -.246 -.297* -.407** -.044 -.102  
.528 .012 .10 .045 .006 .774 .499  
Slot Game control money 
($) transferred (fair v unfair 
slot) 
-.121 -.084 .329* .300* .136 .191 .548** .024 
.423 .58 .026 .043 .371 .203 <.001 .874 
*** p < .001, *p < .05 
 
